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Abstract 
This paper provides an initial empirical analysis of the impact of changing epidemiological, economic and 
sociological conditions on the amount of HIV testing in primary care, outpatient clinics. Particular 
attention is paid to examining whether changes in HIV/AIDS prevalence impact the amount of testing 
these clinics perform, and also how financial constraints impact this relationship. Using a sample of 
California clinics, we find that changing epidemiological conditions do impact the demand for HIV 
testing. Additionally, certain clinic characteristics, such as the type of practitioners providing care and the 
socio-economic characteristics of patients treated at each clinic also affect the demand for testing. 
However, we find little evidence supporting increased government or private grants, contracts and 
donations as a means of enhancing the demand for HIV testing. 
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Introduction 
While the HIV/AIDS epidemic is taking its 
largest toll on societies in Southeast Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the US has also been 
significantly impacted by HIV/AIDS. According 
to the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC, 2004), in 2003 the cumulative 
number of AIDS cases in the US surpassed 
900,000. Additionally, the cumulative number of 
HIV infections exceeded 200,000, with over 
33,000 new infections during the year. 
 
Within the US, the State of California has been 
especially hard-hit by the epidemic. As of 2003, 
California ranks second in the US with over 
133,000 cumulative AIDS cases ― nearly 15 
percent of the nation’s total. It also ranks second 
in the number of new AIDS cases with just over 
5,900 ― nearly 13 percent of the nation’s total 
(CDC, 2004). Moreover, among new AIDS 
cases in 2003, California had the third highest 
proportion of new cases among the Hispanic 
population. Thus, not only has California been 
hard-hit by the disease, but also the impact has 
disproportionately affected its largest minority 
population. 
 
Since there is no known cure for the disease, 
HIV testing is one of the most important actions 
an individual can take to prevent transmitting the 
disease or, once acquired, obtain life-prolonging 
treatment. Given the development of anti-
retroviral which prevent rapid health 
deterioration due to the onset of AIDS, testing is 
important because it allows infected individuals 
to start treatment sooner, thus increasing both 
longevity and quality of life. Despite these facts, 
California ranks only ninth among US states in 
the percent of its population ever tested for HIV, 
and 33rd among states in the percentage of 
individuals between the ages of 18-64 who were 
tested for HIV in 2001 (CDC, 2004). Clearly, 
there is a need to increase both access to, and 
utilization of, HIV testing in California. 
 
For most individuals in California, routine 
outpatient health care services (including testing 
for HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases) 
are provided by primary care outpatient clinics. 
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There are over 760 of these clinics in the State, 
all of which are not-for-profit institutions. While 
these clinics treat a significant number of middle 
and high-income patients (who are generally 
insured by private, third party payers), the 
majority of patients are both poor and of 
minority ethnic backgrounds (Appendix B). 
These clinics generally rely on government-
sponsored insurers, grants and donations to 
cover expenses. Government-sponsored insurers, 
including Medicare, Medicaid and other local 
plans, often do not reimburse as generously as 
private, third party payers. Thus, while these 
clinics provide an initial point of access to health 
care, particularly for underserved populations, 
they may be limited in the extent of care that 
they can provide. 
 
From a policy perspective, it is important to 
understand the role that these primary care 
outpatient clinics play in the fight against 
HIV/AIDS. More specifically, two questions 
appear especially relevant. First, as sociological, 
economic and epidemiological conditions 
change, there should be a corresponding change 
in the demand for HIV testing. If this is the case, 
what proportion of this demand is met by these 
primary care outpatient clinics? If there is a 
strong relationship between changing prevalence 
rates and the amount of testing in these clinics, 
then policy makers can reduce the spread of the 
disease by diverting resources towards primary 
care outpatient clinics.  
 
Second, if these clinics play a significant role in 
providing HIV testing, how do financial 
constraints impact clinics’ abilities to provide 
these services? Previous studies using California 
outpatient clinics (Friesner, 2003; Rosenman, 
Friesner & Stevens, 2005; Rosenman, Li & 
Friesner, 2000) have found evidence indicating 
that revenue considerations (particularly the 
ability to obtain grants and donations, as well as 
reliance on third-party payers) significantly 
impact the quantity and quality of services 
provided. Do specific types of revenue sources 
(reliance on grants and/or Medicaid funding, for 
example) have a disproportionate impact on the 
amount of HIV testing in these clinics? From a 
policy perspective, this is an important question 
because it not only identifies some possible 
methods of increasing HIV testing, but it also 
gives an indication about how resources should 
be allocated to maximize their effectiveness. 
 
This paper provides an initial empirical analysis 
on the impact of changing epidemiological, 
economic and sociological conditions on the 
amount of HIV testing in California outpatient 
clinics. Particular attention is paid to examining 
whether changes in HIV/AIDS prevalence 
impact the amount of testing these clinics 
perform, and also how financial constraints 
impact this relationship. 
 
The remainder of this paper proceeds in four 
steps. First, we present a brief literature review, 
which we use to develop our empirical 
methodology. Next, we present and discuss the 
data used in our analysis. The third section 
contains our empirical results. We conclude the 
paper by discussing the policy implications of 
our findings, as well as providing some 
suggestions for future research. 
 
Literature Review 
The study of socio-demographic determinants of 
HIV testing has been the subject of a significant 
amount of research. Several surveys of persons 
at risk of HIV infection have found that 
increased perception of risk leads to a greater 
demand for HIV testing. In a sample of 621 
homeless women (Nyamathi, Stein and 
Swanson, 2000), increased intravenous drug use, 
unprotected sexual contact and other risky 
behaviors led to higher HIV testing. Extending 
the survey to include men, Stein & Nyamathi 
(2000) examine gender differences for HIV 
testing. While increased perception of risk 
increased the demand for HIV testing for both 
genders, men typically had a lower perception of 
risk despite reports of more risky behavior. 
 
Boozer & Philipson (2000) address the issue of 
risk perception from a slightly different 
perception and find evidence in support of 
public testing for HIV. In this research, a blood 
test for HIV was administered as part of a 
longitudinal survey. This framework for the 
demand for information on HIV implies that 
because only individuals who are surprised by 
the results of the intervention respond to the 
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results (in this case low-risk people who test 
HIV-positive or high-risk individuals who test 
HIV-negative) an information-intervention of 
this type may reach populations who would 
otherwise not seek testing. 
 
A significant amount of research has also 
focused on the special considerations of 
injection drug users (IDU). For example, Harris 
(2006) examined the efficient allocation of 
resources to prevent HIV infection among IDUs 
in the context of the Prevention Point 
Philadelphia, a multi-site needle exchange 
program. At the optimal allocation of needles, 
the estimated cost per case of HIV averted was 
$2,800. This favorable cost-effectiveness ratio 
came primarily from the program’s low 
marginal cost per distributed needle. 
 
In contrast, Heimer, Grau, Curtin, Khoshnood, 
& Singer (2007) sought to determine the extent 
of HIV testing among urban IDUs in order to 
assess the potential effectiveness of additional 
targeted testing programs for this population. Of 
the 1,543 IDUs in the sample, 93% had already 
been tested for HIV. The authors estimated the 
number of undetected infections among urban 
IDUs to be less than 40,000 in the United States. 
As a result, the authors concluded that 
expending scarce prevention money to expand 
testing of IDUs is unlikely to be productive. 
Given the national goals to identify previously 
undetected infections, the authors concluded that 
resources should be spent for proven HIV-
prevention strategies including syringe 
exchange, drug treatment, and secondary 
prevention for those who are HIV positive. 
 
Despite increased demand for HIV testing, most 
people diagnosed with AIDS were generally 
tested late in the course of their HIV infections 
while under acute medical care (Wortley et al., 
1995). The demand for HIV testing varied 
according to risk group, race, and ethnicity.  
Intravenous drug users and heterosexual contact 
risk groups obtained the highest level of HIV 
testing during hospitalization. Additional 
evidence of late testing is found by Nakashima, 
Campsmith, Wolfe, Nakamura, Begley, & 
Teshale (2003). The authors interviewed 5,980 
participants (from 16 different states) aged 18 
and older with HIV or AIDS between May 2000 
and February 2003. Participants were 
categorized in two groups: early testers (those 
who had their first positive test HIV test five or 
more years before the diagnosis of AIDS, or had 
gone five or more years with a diagnosis of 
AIDS after the first positive HIV test) or late 
testers (those who had their first positive HIV 
test one year or less before the diagnosis of 
AIDS). Among participants with AIDS, 24% 
where early testers and 45% were late testers. 
Late testers where more likely than early testers 
(1) to be 18-29 years old, (2) to be black or 
Hispanic, (3) to have acquired HIV through 
heterosexual contacts, (4) to have high school 
education or less, (5) to ever have been tested 
for HIV before the first positive result, (6) to 
have had confidential testing, (7) or to have 
received their first positive result from an HIV 
testing site or an acute or referral care setting. In 
addition, sixty five percent of late testers were 
tested for HIV because of illness, while the most 
common reason for testing among early testers 
was self-perceived risk (twenty nine percent). 
 
Galvan, Bing & Bluthenthal (2000) found that 
racial and age differences exist once testing has 
been obtained. Young people and African 
Americans were less likely to return for results 
of their HIV tests. Age and race were also found 
to be a factor in accepting voluntary HIV testing. 
Hull, Bettinger, Gallaher, Keller, Wilson, & 
Mertz (1988) found that a higher percentage of 
African American males did not participate in 
HIV testing as compared to males from other 
ethnic groups. Kellerman et al. (2002), 
comparing the results from the HIV Testing 
Surveys, HITS1 and HITS2, found a decreasing 
proportion of people under the age of twenty-
five years obtain HIV testing, whereas those 
over twenty-five years of age showed increased 
demand. 
 
Two other patterns of HIV testing are of note.  
People engaging in higher risk behaviors have 
been found (Fernyak, Page-Shafer, Kellogg, 
McFarland, & Katz, 2002) to have higher 
demands for repeated testing. This is further 
evidence that higher perceptions of risk lead not 
only to increased HIV testing, but also repeat 
testing. However, in blind studies of anonymous 
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testing, researchers found that the HIV 
prevalence rates are higher for people who have 
not had voluntary testing, regardless of risk 
group or socio-demographics (Weinstock et al., 
2002). 
 
Finally, there have been a number of studies 
which extend the traditional determinants of the 
demand for HIV testing to include the concepts 
of rational risk taking and the fear associated 
with a the possibility of a positive test. For 
example, Gritzman (2005) provided evidence 
indicating that individuals respond rationally to 
social and economic stimuli when it comes to 
taking risks. Therefore, viewing AIDS as a 
rational disease enriches our understanding of 
the behavioral underpinnings to the spread of 
AIDS and by extension, the determinants of 
demand for testing. 
 
Caplin & Eliaz (2003) addressed the fear of a 
positive test as crucial to understanding the 
demand for testing. There are obviously strong 
health-based incentives to test for AIDS. 
However, the authors postulated that fear may 
override these incentives. They suggested 
decreasing the informativeness of a bad test 
result, thereby mitigating the fear of bad news. 
This would allow the health-based incentives to 
once again come to the forefront of the testing 
decision. The authors developed a model of 
AIDS transmission that acknowledges this form 
of fear. A mechanism is designed that not only 
encourages testing but also shows the spread of 
the disease through voluntary transmission. The 
authors showed that their model confirms that 
psychological interventions may slow the spread 
of AIDS, but conceded that much more work is 
needed in this area. 
 
En totem, our literature review suggests three 
major hypotheses about the determinants of the 
demand for HIV testing. Stated in alternative 
form, these hypotheses can be characterized via 
the following statements: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Higher levels of 
(perceived) risk should lead to an increased 
demand for HIV testing. 
 
In this analysis, we measure perceived risk as an 
actual change in epidemiological conditions and 
outpatient clinics as the primary source for such 
tests. This assumes that individuals base their 
perceptions (at least partially) on some form of 
fact. Moreover, if people base their perceptions 
solely on fact, one would expect the demand for 
testing, on average, would change in direct 
proportion to changing epidemiological 
conditions. If fear, information uncertainty or 
other factors were used in the evaluation of risk 
perception, then this relationship would not be 
proportional, and (in extreme cases, for example, 
if individuals become fatalistic) possible 
inversely proportional. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Enhanced clinic 
resources should lead to an increased demand 
for HIV testing. 
 
Our second hypothesis implies that endowing 
the outpatient clinics with additional manpower 
and/or monetary resources should allow them to 
be more proactive in providing services to their 
constituents, and thus induce a greater quantity 
demanded for their services. The underlying 
assumption to Hypothesis 2 is that clinics are 
under-funded and/or understaffed, and do not 
use their market power to exploit their patients. 
Thus, if we fail to reject Hypothesis 2 (again, in 
its null form), researchers and policy-makers 
may want to re-examine the tactics and practices 
of these clinics, as they would not be fulfilling 
their core missions of community service. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The demand for HIV 
testing should vary by the socio-economic 
characteristics of the community the clinic 
serves. 
 
Our literature review implies that clinics serving 
poorer communities and those with higher 
minority populations should experience a lower 
demand for testing. One interesting corollary to 
this hypothesis (which we control for but, to our 
knowledge, has not been addressed in the 
literature) is the importance of distinguishing 
between the socio-economic characteristics of 
the entire community in which the clinic resides 
and those of the sub-population that utilize the 
clinic’s services. This is especially true for 
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clinics operating in urban and/or geographically 
dispersed communities, which may cater to 
specific minority group, or may share the 
responsibility for serving the greater community 
with a small number of other clinics. 
 
Data 
Our primary source of data comes from the 
California Office of Statewide Health Planning 
and Development (OSHPD). Each year, all 
primary care, outpatient clinics in the State are 
required to report revenue, expense and 
utilization data to OSHPD. These data are 
subsequently packaged and made available on 
the OSHPD website (http://www.oshpd.ca.gov). 
Our data come from these reports for the 
calendar year 2004. The complete set of data 
contains 804 clinics. After eliminating 
observations due to missing or mis-measured 
data, our sample consists of 706 observations. 
We eliminated 67 clinics because they were 
either not open for a full calendar year, or had a 
suspended operating license. Another 25 
observations were eliminated because they 
provided mis-measured or unreliable data. 
Specifically, seven clinics reported having zero 
employees, four clinics reported zero operating 
revenue and five clinics reported negative prices 
for treating Medicare and Medi-Cal insured 
patients. We also eliminated nine firms for not 
treating at least 30 patients in a full year. Lastly, 
six observations were eliminated because they 
failed to report any information on the poverty 
status of their patients. Appendix A contains the 
names and definitions of all of the variables used 
in our analysis. 
 
We measure the amount of HIV testing within a 
clinic with two, related variables. The first, HIV, 
is a truncated variable that gives a value of zero 
if the clinic performed no HIV tests and the 
quantity of HIV tests performed otherwise. (The 
technical definition for this variable is the 
quantity of procedures performed under CPT 
codes 86701-86703 and 87390-87391). 
 
Because approximately half of the clinics did not 
perform any HIV tests, we also created a dummy 
variable (HIVDV) that gives a value of one if 
the clinic performed HIV tests, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
The data allow for the construction of a number 
of variables describing the operating 
characteristics of these clinics. For example, the 
data contain a dummy variable identifying 
clinics located in rural areas (as defined by 
OSHPD). The data also include the total number 
of full time equivalent employees (FTEs) who 
have direct patient contact. This data is further 
disaggregated by the type of FTE (e.g., 
physician, dentist, physician’s assistant, nurse 
family practitioner, etc.) as well as the method 
by which FTEs are compensated (e.g., salary, 
contract, or volunteer). 
 
We construct a number of variables describing 
the populations served by each clinic. 
Information was collected on the total number of 
patients receiving treatment at each clinic. This 
data is also disaggregated by race (white, black 
and all other races), ethnicity (Hispanic versus 
non-Hispanic), age (patients aged 65 and older 
versus all other ages) and gender. Patient level 
data are also decomposed by income level 
(below 100 percent of the poverty level, between 
100-200 percent of the poverty level, above 200 
percent of the poverty level, and non-reporters). 
To ease exposition and reduce the possibility of 
heteroskedasticity in our empirical analysis, we 
express each patient sub-group as a proportion 
of the total number of patients. 
 
As noted earlier, financial concerns may 
influence a clinic’s ability to offer HIV testing. 
Because these clinics are not-for-profit, and 
because many clinics treat a disproportionate 
number of disadvantaged individuals, 
government and philanthropic sources of 
revenue are vital to a clinic’s ability to cover its 
operating expenses. Our data allow us to 
measure several of these potential revenue 
sources. First, we collect information on grant 
and contract monies from Federal, local (state, 
county and other local agencies) and private 
sources. We also identified the dollar value of 
donations to each clinic. Lastly, we measured 
the average price per patient encounter that 
Medicare and Medi-Cal (California’s Medicaid 
program) reimburse clinics. Because both 
Medicare and Medi-Cal have both traditional 
and managed care programs, we provide two 
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separate prices for each insurance program. Two 
comments are in order here. First, a patient 
encounter is the appropriate measure of output 
for prices, because a particular patient may visit 
a clinic multiple times during the year, making 
the number of patient encounters at least as large 
as the number of patients. Because price is, by 
definition, average revenue per unit of use, the 
number of encounters is the appropriate 
measure. For a more detailed discussion of this 
issue, see Rosenman et al. (2000) and Rosenman 
et al. (2005). Second, all Medicare and Medi-Cal 
programs (whether managed care or otherwise) 
reimburse for services in a manner consistent 
with prospective payment. As a result, clinics do 
not have the ability to significantly manipulate 
the average reimbursement per encounter they 
receive for treating Medicare and Medi-Cal-
insured patients (Friesner, 2003). 
 
Because not all clinics treat all types of 
Medicare and Medi-Cal patients, nor do all 
clinics have access to all four grant/contract and 
donation sources, we also create a series of 
dummy variables that identify whether a 
particular clinic has access to a particular 
revenue source. Finally, to reduce the potential 
for heteroskedasticity, we take the natural 
logarithm of our grant/contract and donation 
variables. 
 
From our literature review, we expect 
demographic, economic and epidemiological 
conditions outside of a clinic’s control to impact 
HIV testing decisions; therefore, county level 
information was collected on these 
characteristics. Data on the spread of HIV/AIDS 
was collected from the California HIV 
Cumulative Surveillance Reports, which are 
published monthly (and by county) by the 
California Department of Health Services, 
Office of AIDS. These reports are available on 
the web at CADHS. These reports contain 
information about the cumulative number of 
AIDS cases (both currently living and total), 
AIDS-related deaths, and total HIV cases per 
county. 
 
We use this data to construct three variables, 
which we believe adequately measure the 
current state of the disease in each county 
between December 31, 2003 and December 31, 
2004: the change in the cumulative number of 
living AIDS cases in a county; the change in the 
cumulative number of AIDS deaths; and the 
change in the cumulative number of HIV 
infections. We use the change in these 
cumulative data to capture the extent of the 
epidemic during 2004. Additionally, each of 
these variables provides information (in a 
manner consistent with the static, marginal 
nature of our analysis) about the history, 
potential growth and potential decline of the 
epidemic. In particular, the number of new HIV 
infections represents the potential growth of the 
epidemic, while the number of AIDS deaths in 
2004 represents potential decline.  Since there is 
usually a large incubation period between HIV 
infection and the onset of AIDS, the number of 
living AIDS cases also provides some 
information about the history of the epidemic in 
a particular county. 
 
As a measure of economic prosperity within a 
county, we collected data on average weekly 
wages per county (in 2004) from the California 
Economic Development Department. This 
weekly measure was subsequently multiplied by 
52 to arrive at an average yearly income 
variable. Demographic data were obtained from 
the US Census Bureau. In addition to the total 
population per county, we collected data on race, 
Hispanic origin, sex and age. Consistent with 
our clinic-specific demographics, we express 
each of our demographic variables as a 
proportion of the total population to reduce the 
potential for heteroskedasticity. 
 
Appendix B contains some basic descriptive 
statistics for non-truncated variables used in our 
analysis. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics 
for non-zero observations of our truncated 
variables. The following are characteristics of 
the average (mean) clinic. Approximately half 
(350 out of 706) of the clinics provide HIV 
testing. Of these 350 clinics that do provide 
testing, 378.98 tests are performed annually. 
These clinics have approximately 5.2 full time 
staff who provide services to patients. Of these 
FTEs, thirty-eight percent are physicians and 
twenty-four percent are nurse practitioners. The 
majority of the staff are employed on a salary 
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basis, as opposed to a contract or a volunteer 
basis. Seventy percent of patients are white, 
while just under fifty percent are Hispanic. In 
our data, Hispanic is treated as an ethnicity, as 
opposed to a race. As a result, a large proportion 
of patients classified as white are also likely to 
be Hispanic. Nearly sixty percent of patients are 
below the poverty line, and nearly two-thirds of 
patients are female. 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Conditional Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean SD No. of Observations 
HIV 378.98 513.17 350 
LFEDGT 12.16 1.53 426 
LLOCALGT 11.53 1.66 421 
LPVTGT 10.53 2.01 332 
LDONATE 10.09 2.49 373 
PCARE 83.15 108.08 477 
PMCARE 234.63 693.52 84 
PCAL 111.63 86.80 623 
PMCAL 430.28 2787.57 390 
 
 
 
The revenue variables indicate that clinics utilize 
a wide variety of sources to obtain funds. With 
the exception of managed Medicare, each 
revenue source is utilized by between one half 
and two-thirds of the clinics, on average. Clinics 
appear to be highly reliant on traditional 
Medicare and Medi-Cal reimbursement, as well 
as Federal grant and contract funds. Not 
surprisingly, among clinics receiving positive 
funds, clinics receive a larger amount of funds 
from Federal sources than from local or private 
sources. Reimbursement for traditional Medi-
Cal patients is also more generous than 
Medicare, at the mean. 
 
The county level demographics also corroborate 
our earlier assertion that these clinics treat a 
disproportionate number of disadvantaged 
individuals within a particular county. Mean 
yearly income per county is approximately 
$42,700 ― a value much higher than the poverty 
level. The proportions of black, Hispanic and 
female residents in each county are also lower 
than the mean proportions of patients that an 
average clinic treats. 
 
Lastly, the descriptive statistics for our 
epidemiological variables provide some insight 
into the extent of the epidemic in California. 
During 2004, an average of 314 individuals in a 
given county was living with AIDS, and 
approximately 47 people per county died of 
AIDS. Approximately 1,234 people per county, 
on average, were HIV-positive in 2004. Clearly, 
these statistics imply both a growing epidemic as 
well as the need for policies designed to curb the 
spread of the disease and provide palliative care 
for those already infected. 
 
Empirical Methodology 
Our empirical methodology operates under a 
number of assumptions, which are all consistent 
with the economic and epidemiological 
literatures. Perhaps most importantly, we assume 
clinics are the primary source of care for 
disadvantaged individuals within their 
communities. From an economic standpoint this 
implies clinics have a high degree of monopoly 
power over this segment of society. At the very 
least, these firms can be considered as 
monopolistic competitors, meaning they hold 
power over a segment of the market for health 
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care in the short run. Given the time frame of 
our analysis, this less stringent assumption is 
also sufficient to justify our empirical approach. 
 
As such, clinics base operating decisions by 
assessing the demand curve for their services. 
The implication of this assumption is that issues 
of endogeneity arising from estimating a 
demand curve without also controlling for 
factors affecting the supply curve for clinic 
services are irrelevant, since these firms 
essentially do not face a supply curve for their 
services. 
 
Given our literature review and data constraints, 
we postulate a reduced form, linear in 
coefficients and variables equation to explain the 
demand for HIV testing, which we estimate 
using regression analysis techniques. The 
advantages of this approach are that it is both 
parsimonious and also allows the signs and 
significance of each individual coefficient 
estimate to test each of the hypotheses identified 
in our literature review. 
 
The Probit Model 
A crucial econometric issue is how to specify 
the dependent variable for our regression 
analysis, and consequently the regression 
technique to estimate our equation. We have two 
dependent variables, both of which express 
similar information, but in different ways.  Our 
HIVDV variable is a binary indicator of whether 
or not a clinic offers HIV testing. We examine 
whether epidemiologic, clinic-specific and 
socio-economic factors influence the demand for 
testing by estimating a standard Probit model 
(Greene, 2000) (see Figure 1): 
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where: P() denotes the cumulative normal distribution function; 
 W denotes an nx3 vector of county-level HIV/AIDS variables; 
 X denotes an nx11 vector of clinic-specific demographic variables; 
 Y denotes an nx6 vector of county-specific demographic variables; 
 Z denotes an nx16 vector of clinic financial variables; and 
 n denotes the sample size. 
Figure 1 
Standard Probit Model (Greene, 2000) 
 
 
 
One other technical note about the probit model 
deserves mentioning. Because the model is 
estimated via maximum likelihood (an 
inherently non-linear procedure), the coefficient 
estimates in the probit model cannot be directly 
interpreted as marginal effects, as is the case in 
other regression procedures such as ordinary 
least squares (OLS). However, the probit model 
does facilitate the construction of marginal 
effects, which are directly dependent on these 
coefficient estimates. As such, when interpreting 
the results of the probit model, we give primary 
emphasis to interpreting the signs, magnitudes 
and significance of the marginal effects, as 
opposed to the coefficient estimates. 
 
The signs and significance of our marginal 
effects (and their underlying parameter 
estimates) can be used to test Hypotheses 1 – 3. 
For example, if the marginal effects for our 
HIV/AIDS variables are significantly different 
from zero, then we would reject Hypothesis 1 (in 
its null form). Moreover, the magnitudes of 
these marginal effects (if significant) allow us to 
gain additional information about how 
epidemiological conditions impact whether 
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clinics perform HIV tests. Similar analysis of the 
clinic-specific and socio-economic marginal 
effects can be used to test Hypotheses 2 and 3, 
respectively. 
 
The Tobit Model 
The HIV variable takes this a step further by 
identifying the number of tests provided, and 
zero otherwise. Thus, HIV is essentially a 
variable that is either censored or truncated (on 
the left side of the distribution) at zero. The 
crucial issue is how to interpret the values of 
HIV at the censoring or truncation point. One 
approach is to assume that the zero values are 
determined simultaneously with the positive 
values. Our HIV variable is actually a count 
variable. This implies that the distribution is 
censored, and can be estimated with a standard 
Tobit model (Greene 2000). In the context of our 
study, this model can be expressed as: 
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where: HIV* is the value for HIV in the absence of censoring (i.e., if demand 
could be positive, zero or negative) which could, if observed, be 
estimated using standard ordinary least squares (OLS) techniques; 
 HIV = max( 0, HIV*) is the observed (and censored) vector of HIV 
values; 
 ε is a normally distributed error term with a mean of zero and a constant 
variance; 
 and the remaining variables are defined identically to the probit model. 
 
Figure 2 
Tobit Model (Greene, 2000) 
 
 
 
As with the probit model, the Tobit model is 
estimated by defining and subsequently 
maximizing the (cumulative) log likelihood 
function for a censored (at HIV = 0) normal 
distribution. When testing Hypotheses 1 – 3, this 
also forces us to calculate and interpret marginal 
effects, as opposed to simply interpreting the 
model’s coefficient estimates. 
 
Heckman’s Two-Step Estimator 
Alternatively, it may be the case that the zero 
values are determined prior to the positive 
values. This means that there may exist some 
process determining whether there is zero or 
positive demand for HIV testing. If positive 
demand exists, the quantity of testing is 
subsequently determined through a second 
process. This phenomenon is often referred to as 
incidental truncation, and it is generally 
necessary to employ Heckman’s two-step 
estimation procedure to estimate the regression 
equation of interest (Greene, 2000). The first 
step in this procedure is to estimate the 
determinants of whether or not a clinic 
experiences a demand for HIV testing using a 
probit model, as defined above. The predicted 
probabilities from this regression (in the form of 
an Inverse Mills Ratio) are calculated and used 
as an instrument in the second step (which is 
conducted using OLS) to control for the 
potential effects of the incidental truncation. The 
Inverse Mills Ratio is the standard normal 
probability density function (evaluated at some 
point, usually the sample mean values) divided 
by the standard normal cumulative density 
function (again, evaluated at the sample mean 
values). In general, the first step’s regression 
results should always have at least as many 
regressors as the second step regression 
(Wooldridge, 2000). In our case, we use the 
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exact same number of regressors in each step, 
although in many studies it is common to add 
additional regressors to the first step’s 
estimation (all of which must be relevant, 
exogenous determinants of the dependent 
variable) in order to reduce the effects of 
multicollinearity. We use the same number of 
regressors because it is a more parsimonious 
approach. We also ran several variations of this 
first step estimation procedure where additional 
regressors were added, and there were no 
significant changes in the second step results. 
Our two-step estimation procedure can be 
characterized as follows Figure 3): 
 
 
 
Step 1: Estimate the probit model defined above and save the Inverse Mills Ratio, or 
IMR. 
 
Step 2: Use OLS to estimate the following: 
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where: HIV’ is the subset of non-zero HIV values; and the remaining variables are 
identical to those postulated in the Probit model. 
Figure 3 
Heckman’s Two-Step Estimator 
 
 
 
 
The question of interest is whether the data are 
censored or incidentally truncated.  To check, 
we employ Hausman’s (1978) specification test. 
The test operates under the null hypothesis of 
incidental truncation; that is, that the zeros and 
positive values are determined simultaneously. 
In this case, both the Tobit and incidental 
truncation models provide consistent estimates, 
but the Tobit model’s estimates are more 
efficient. In this case, we place more emphasis 
on the Tobit results. Rejection of the null implies 
that the zero and positive values are determined 
sequentially, in which case the incidental 
truncation estimates are consistent, but the Tobit 
results are not. The test is distributed as chi-
square, with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of intercept and slope parameters. 
 
A final issue concerns the transformations of our 
independent variables. Adding proportional 
variables that are both mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive (e.g., the proportion of 
male and female patients) as independent 
variables in a regression will necessarily create 
perfect multicollinearity with the equation’s 
intercept. A common approach (which we utilize 
here) is to drop one of the multicollinear 
regressors from the regression (Greene, 2000). 
As such, all coefficient estimates are measured 
relative to the omitted category. 
 
Empirical Results 
Appendices C and D contain our empirical 
results. Appendix C contains the results from 
our probit model. The chi-square test for overall 
model fit is highly significant, indicating that the 
model does an acceptable job of predicting our 
dependent variable. Our primary focus 
(Hypothesis 1) is whether changing 
epidemiological conditions within a community 
induce changes in the demand for HIV testing in 
the primary care clinics serving these 
communities. Our results indicate that this is the 
case. Specifically, the mean marginal effect for 
our SDAIDS variable (the number of AIDS 
deaths in a county in 2004) is –4.786, and 
significant at the one percent level. This 
indicates that, for each additional person dying 
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of AIDS per county in 2004, the likelihood of a 
positive demand for HIV testing in these clinics 
falls by 4.8 percent, holding all other specified 
regressors constant. From an economic-
epidemiological perspective this makes sense; a 
higher number of AIDS deaths, holding HIV 
conditions constant, leaves fewer people in the 
population from which someone can acquire the 
disease. Thus, there is a lower need for HIV 
testing. 
 
It is also interesting to note that our other two 
HIV-related explanatory variables are not 
statistically significant determinants of HIV-
related testing. This indicates that efforts 
designed to increase testing in these clinics will 
not be successful unless it is solely targeted at 
the number of AIDS deaths, and not the number 
of HIV infections or living AIDS cases. 
 
Our results also identify a number of other 
variables that impact the likelihood of HIV 
testing, implying rejection of Hypotheses 2 and 
3 as well. First, the types of practitioners staffing 
these clinics influence the likelihood of 
increased testing. Increasing the proportion of 
physicians, physician’s assistants and family 
nurse practitioners all increase the likelihood of 
clinic HIV testing. All categories of providers 
are statistically significant, and the magnitude of 
the marginal impact of family nurse practitioners 
is greatest. 
 
The (mean) marginal effect of an increase in 
low-income patients also has a positive and 
significant impact on the likelihood of HIV 
testing. This indicates that low-income people 
are utilizing these clinics for one of their 
intended purposes ― an access point for HIV 
testing. Demographics within the clinic and 
county also impact the likelihood of HIV testing. 
A higher proportion of a clinic’s patients that are 
black, Hispanic, or age 65 or older all 
significantly reduce the likelihood of HIV 
testing. Higher proportions of female patients, 
however, significantly increase the likelihood of 
HIV testing. This also has policy implications: 
racial and ethnic minorities are not utilizing 
these clinics as an access point for testing. 
 
Our county-level economic and demographic 
variables indicate the need to control for the 
distributional consequences of socio-economic 
factors influencing HIV testing. The county 
income variable is positive and statistically 
significantly different from zero (at the ten 
percent level), implying that increases in income 
throughout the county also increase the demand 
for HIV testing.  The implication is that mid and 
high-income individuals are also utilizing these 
clinics as an access point for testing. Increases in 
the elderly and Hispanic communities in a 
clinic’s county also increase the likelihood of 
HIV testing.  One interpretation of this finding is 
that clinics in these communities are providing 
services to a specific component of the racial 
and ethnic communities within a county. As 
such, policies designed to increase HIV testing 
at these clinics should not be directed at these 
communities as a whole, but at the components 
of this population who regularly use these clinics 
for other health care services. 
 
Lastly, three clinic-level financial variables 
impact the likelihood of HIV testing. Clinics 
providing services to non-managed care 
Medicare patients, on average, experience a 
higher likelihood of HIV testing. However, the 
average reimbursement for these services has no 
significant impact. Concomitantly, a clinic’s 
receipt of donations has a mixed, but highly 
significant impact on HIV testing. If a clinic 
receives donations it has a higher likelihood of 
providing HIV testing. However, increasing the 
level of donations has a negative and significant 
mean effect. 
 
Appendix D, Panel A contains our Tobit and 
incidental truncation regression results for HIV 
testing variable. The Hausman specification test 
yielded a value of 9.68, which is statistically 
insignificant from zero at a five percent 
significance level. As such, we give primary 
emphasis to the Tobit results. The chi-square 
statistic indicates that the Tobit model does 
explain a significant portion of variation in the 
quantity of HIV testing.  The disturbance term 
(which measures the amount of censoring in the 
model) is also statistically significant, which 
supports the rationale for adjusting the 
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estimation technique to control for the censoring 
of the dependent variable. 
 
The mean marginal effect of the number of 
AIDS deaths in the Tobit model is negative and 
statistically significant. The number of HIV 
infections in 2004 is also statistically 
insignificant from zero. The number of living 
cases of AIDS is now positive and significant (at 
the five percent level). This implies that changes 
in the number AIDS deaths are negatively 
associated with both the likelihood and quantity 
of HIV tests provided. The number of living 
AIDS cases, however, does not impact whether 
HIV testing services are offered, but it does 
positively impact the quantity of services 
provided. 
 
The proportion of a clinic’s staff that is a nurse 
family practitioner positively and significantly 
increases the amount of HIV testing. 
Interestingly, the proportion of staff that is 
physicians or physician’s assistants is not 
statistically significant determinants of the 
dependent variable. This indicates that certain 
types of staff within a clinic may be more 
successful than others at increasing HIV testing 
and awareness. 
 
The economic and demographic variables also 
significantly impact the quantity of HIV testing. 
An increase in both the quantity of low-income 
patients visiting the clinic, as well as increasing 
the average income level in the county a clinic 
serves, increases the amount of HIV testing 
clinics perform. Increases in the proportion of 
black, Hispanic and elderly patients currently 
receiving other health care services from the 
clinics, on average, reduce the quantity of HIV 
tests, while increases in the entire Hispanic 
community within a community significantly 
increase the number of HIV tests. The 
proportion of white patients receiving other 
services from the clinics is a positive and 
significant determinant of the quantity of HIV 
testing in the Tobit model.  Additionally, the 
mean marginal effect of the elderly population in 
a county is not significant in the Tobit 
regression. 
 
The results in Appendix D (Panel A) show that 
providing a positive number of Medicare 
services has a positive and statistically 
significant mean impact on the quantity of HIV 
testing.  However, donations are not statistically 
significant determinants of the quantity of HIV 
tests. Instead, Federal and local government 
grants influence the quantity of tests performed.  
In particular, receiving Federal grants and 
contracts has a negative and significant mean 
marginal effect on the quantity of testing, but 
increases in the level of Federal funding have a 
positive and significant impact. Additionally, the 
ability to receive local government grants and 
contracts has a negative and significant impact 
on HIV testing. Thus, simply giving money to 
these outpatient clinics will not necessarily 
increase the amount of HIV testing. Instead, 
policies should also be concerned with the level 
of funding provided to these clinics for such a 
purpose. 
 
The results from Heckman’s two-step sample 
selection model (Appendix D, Panel B) closely 
mimic those from the Tobit model, with only a 
few minor exceptions. As such, the policy 
implications of the Tobit model are, by and 
large, supported by the sample selection model. 
Consistent with the Tobit model, the sample 
selection equation’s chi-square statistic and F-
test are highly significant, indicating a 
reasonable fit of the dependent variable. The 
Inverse Mills Ratio coefficient estimate is also 
statistically different from zero (at a .05 
significance level), implying a need to control 
for the truncation of the dependent variable. 
 
As mentioned above, the signs and significance 
of the sample selection model closely mimic the 
Tobit model, with three exceptions. First, the 
proportion of black patients visiting these clinics 
is no longer statistically significant, nor is the 
proportion of a county’s population that is white. 
Third, the Federal grant and contract variables 
are no longer statistically significant. The latter 
finding is particularly important because it casts 
doubt on whether Federal grant and contract 
monies are effective at increasing the amount of 
HIV testing in these clinics. 
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These discrepancies may also be due to the fact 
that the incidental truncation model’s results are 
not only less efficient than those of the Tobit 
model, but also could be distorted by 
multicolinearity between the IMR and the 
second step regressors, both of which lead to 
inflated standard error estimates and lower 
levels of statistical significance. 
 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The main goal of our paper was to empirically 
determine what factors were significantly 
responsible for increasing or reducing the 
likelihood and quantity of HIV testing 
performed in outpatient, community clinics. 
Since outpatient clinics are a primary access 
point for health care not only in California, but 
also in communities across the US, an 
understanding of these factors is an essential tool 
for constructing policies that are effective in 
controlling the US HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
 
Our findings indicate several factors that may be 
useful at increasing HIV testing. First, our 
results show that HIV testing is responsive to the 
change in the AIDS population, but not the HIV-
infected population. That is, people appear to 
want testing only when they see an increase in 
the number of people living with AIDS (which 
increases the potential for infection, and thus the 
need for testing) and a reduction in the number 
of AIDS deaths (which has a similar impact). As 
a result, policies promoting HIV testing may 
want to focus on these epidemiological factors, 
as opposed to HIV prevalence statistics. 
 
Second, certain types of medical staff are 
positively associated with a higher amount and 
likelihood of HIV testing. Nurse practitioners, 
and to a lesser extent, physicians and physician’s 
assistants, are most effective at increasing HIV 
testing. This implies that HIV prevention and 
awareness policies should include these types of 
staff as an integral part of any such policy 
implemented at the level of the outpatient clinic. 
 
Third, demographics play a crucial role in the 
demand for HIV testing. While this finding is 
not new, what we do find to extend this 
literature is that clinics play a unique role in HIV 
prevention by being able to target policies at 
specific sub-components of a population, most 
notably poor women and minorities. What 
makes this finding especially useful for policy 
makers is that these groups are extremely high-
risk components of the population, and thus 
most in need of effective policy intervention. 
 
Lastly, we do find evidence that outside sources 
of funding may be effective at increasing HIV 
testing in outpatient clinics. However, our 
results here are quite mixed. Some sources of 
funds increase the likelihood that a clinic offers 
HIV testing, but do not significantly impact the 
amount of HIV testing. Other sources of funds 
are only marginally significant determinants of 
funding, depending on how one estimates the 
demand for HIV testing. Thus, simply “throwing 
money at the problem” may not be an effective 
means of combating the epidemic. 
 
While our results present some intriguing 
findings, they should also be viewed with 
caution. Our study only looks at California 
outpatient clinics in a single year. Future studies 
analyzing health care providers who have 
different operating characteristics, operate at 
different points in time, serve different socio-
economic segments of the population, and who 
face different epidemiological conditions may 
find disparate results. We view this study as an 
initial step to spark discussion and future 
research about the effectiveness of these health 
care providers as a focal point in combating the 
spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
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Appendix A 
Variable Names and Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Clinic-Level HIV Testing Variables 
HIVDV 
Dummy variable identifying whether an outpatient clinic provided HIV testing in 
2004 
HIV Number of HIV tests performed at an outpatient clinic 
Clinic-Level Demographic Variables 
RURAL Dummy variable identifying outpatient clinics in rural areas 
FTE Number of full time equivalent staff devoted to treating patients 
MD Proportion of a clinic’s FTEs that are physicians 
PA Proportion of a clinic’s FTEs that are physician assistants 
NFP Proportion of a clinic’s FTEs that are family nurse practitioners 
DENT Proportion of a clinic’s FTEs that are Dentists 
OTH Proportion of a clinic’s FTEs that are not included in the above four categories 
SALARY Proportion of a clinic’s FTEs that are on salary 
CONT Proportion of a clinic’s FTEs that are paid contractually 
VOLUN Proportion of a clinic’s FTEs that are volunteers 
TOTPAT Total number of patients visiting an outpatient clinic 
WHITEPT Proportion of a clinic’s patients that are white 
BLACKPT Proportion of a clinic’s patients that are black 
HISPPT Proportion of a clinic’s patients that are Hispanic 
LOWPOVPT Proportion of a clinic’s patients that are below 100 percent of the poverty level 
MIDPOVPT 
Proportion of a clinic’s patients that are between 100 and 200 percent of the poverty 
level 
UPPOVPT Proportion of a clinic’s patients that are above 200 percent of the poverty level 
OTHPOVPT Proportion of a clinic’s patients that do not report income information 
ELDERPT Proportion of a clinic’s patients that are age 65 and older 
FEMALEPT Proportion of a clinic’s patients that are female 
Clinic-Level Financial Variables 
LPVTGT Dummy variable identifying whether a clinic received Federal grant or contract 
funds 
FEDDV Variable giving the natural log of Federal grant and contract money, and zero if the 
clinic did not receive these funds 
LFEDGT Dummy variable identifying whether a clinic received state, county or local grant or 
contract funds 
LOCALDV Variable giving the natural log of state, county and local grant and contract money, 
and zero if the clinic did not receive these funds 
LLOCALGT Dummy variable identifying whether a clinic received private grant or contract funds
PVTDV Variable giving the natural log of private grants and contract money, and zero if the 
clinic did not receive these funds 
DONATEDV Dummy variable identifying whether a clinic received donations 
LDONATE Variable giving the log of donations, and zero if the clinic did not receive these funds
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Variable Definition 
CAREDV Dummy variable identifying whether a clinic treated (non-managed care)  Medicare 
patients 
PCARE Variable that gives the average price the clinic received for treating (non-managed 
care) Medicare patient encounters, and zero if the clinic did not treat these patients 
MCAREDV Dummy variable identifying whether a clinic treated managed care Medicare 
Patients 
PMCARE Variable that gives the average price the clinic received for treating managed care 
Medicare patient encounters, and zero if the clinic did not treat these patients 
CALDV Dummy variable identifying whether a clinic treated (non-managed care) MediCal 
Patients 
PCAL Variable that gives the average price the clinic received for treating (non-managed 
care) MediCal patient encounters, and zero if the clinic did not treat these patients 
MCALDV Dummy variable identifying whether a clinic treated managed care MediCal patients
PMCAL Variable that gives the average price the clinic received for treating managed care 
MediCal patient encounters, and zero if the clinic did not treat these patients 
County-Level Demographic and Financial Variables 
WAGE Average yearly income per county 
PWHITE Proportion of a county’s population that is white 
PBLACK Proportion of a county’s population that is black 
PHISP ion Proportion of county’s population that is Hispanic 
PELDER Proportion of a county’s population that is age 65 and older 
PFEMALE Proportion of a county’s population that is female 
County-Level Epidemiological Variables 
CTACASE3 Total number of AIDS cases in a county between 1981 and 2003 
CLACASE3 Total number of living AIDS cases in a county between 1981 and 2003 
CADEATH3 Total number of AIDS deaths in a county between 1981 and 2003 
CTACASE4 Total number of AIDS cases in a county between 1981 and 2004 
CLACASE4 Total number of living AIDS cases in a county between 1981 and 2004 
CADEATH4 Total number of AIDS deaths in a county between 1981 and 2004 
CHCASE3 Total number of HIV cases between 1981 and 2003 
CHCASE4 Total number of HIV cases between 1981 and 2004 
SAIDS Change in the number of living AIDS cases in a county between 2004 and 2003 
SDAIDS Change in the number of AIDS deaths in a county between 2004 and 2003 
SHIV Change in the total number of HIV cases between 2004 and 2003 
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Appendix B 
 
Unconditional Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Clinic-Level HIV Testing Variables 
HIVDV 0.496 0.500 
Clinic-Level Demographic Variables 
RURAL 0.052 0.223 
FTE 5.249 8.642 
MD 0.378 0.305 
PA 0.101 0.188 
NFP 0.236 0.304 
DENT 0.098 0.222 
OTH 0.187 0.256 
SALARY 0.815 0.314 
CONT 0.121 0.243 
VOLUN 0.064 0.218 
TOTPAT 4659.760 4866.900 
WHITEPT 0.704 0.293 
BLACKPT 0.075 0.129 
HISPPT 0.478 0.316 
LOWPOVPT 0.591 0.281 
MIDPOVPT 0.186 0.165 
UPPOVPT 0.071 0.141 
OTHPOVPT 0.152 0.269 
ELDERPT 0.071 0.152 
FEMALEPT 0.647 0.171 
Clinic-Level Financial Variables 
FEDDV 0.603 0.490 
LOCALDV 0.596 0.491 
PVTDV 0.470 0.499 
DONATEDV 0.528 0.500 
CAREDV 0.676 0.468 
MCAREDV 0.119 0.324 
CALDV 0.882 0.322 
MCALDV 0.552 0.498 
County-Level Demographic and Financial Variables 
WAGE 41752.800 10384.700 
PWHITE 0.783 0.103 
PBLACK 0.062 0.038 
 69
D. Friesner et al. / Californian Journal of Health Promotion 2007, Volume 5, Issue 4, 52-75 
 
 
 
Appendix B (continued) 
Unconditional Descriptive Statistics 
 
PHISP 0.324 0.142
PELDER 0.111 0.020
PFEMALE 0.499 0.014
County-Level Epidemiological Variables 
CTACASE3 14249.200 18823.800
CLACASE3 5761.250 7480.500
CADEATH3 8487.990 11368.000
CTACASE4 14610.700 19414.700
CLACASE4 6075.760 7987.000
CADEATH4 8534.910 11455.500
CHCASE3 2632.450 3147.770
CHCASE4 3866.700 4995.630
SAIDS 314.511 516.445
SDAIDS 46.921 92.960
SHIV 1234.250 1903.970
Number of observations  706
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Appendix C 
 
Bivariate Probit Model (Dependent Variable: HIVDV) 
 
Variable Coefficient T-Ratio Marginal Effect T-Ratio 
Constant -7.430** -2.176 -2.956** -2.176 
County Epidemiology 
SAIDS 0.002 1.228 0.001 1.228 
SDAIDS -0.020*** -4.788 -0.008*** -4.786 
SHIV 0.000 0.569 0.000 0.569 
Clinic Demographics 
RURAL 0.201 0.758 0.080 0.759 
MD 0.427* 1.806 0.170* 1.808 
PA 0.621* 1.853 0.247* 1.853 
NFP 0.862*** 3.195 0.343*** 3.196 
VOLUN -0.104 -0.283 -0.041 -0.283 
LOWPOVPT 1.186*** 5.146 0.472*** 5.148 
WHITEPT 0.315 1.277 0.125 1.276 
BLACKPT -1.147** -2.165 -0.456** -2.164 
HISPPT -0.592** -2.200 -0.236** -2.200 
ELDERPT -2.373*** -3.096 -0.944*** -3.101 
FEMALEPT 0.951** 2.271 0.378** 2.270 
County Demographics 
WAGE 0.000* 1.774 0.000* 1.773 
PWHITE 0.603 0.330 0.240 0.330 
PBLACK 2.027 0.582 0.807 0.582 
PHISP 2.804*** 3.114 1.116*** 3.114 
PELDER 9.665* 1.722 3.846* 1.722 
PFEMALE 3.069 0.614 1.221 0.614 
Clinic Financial Variables 
FEDDV -1.109* -1.649 -0.441* -1.649 
LFEDGT 0.136** 2.446 0.054** 2.447 
LOCALDV -0.347 -0.630 -0.138 -0.630 
LLOCALGT 0.013 0.275 0.005 0.275 
PVTDV -0.338 -0.689 -0.135 -0.689 
LPVTGT 0.018 0.412 0.007 0.412 
DONATEDV 1.654*** 4.649 0.658*** 4.643 
LDONATE -0.113*** -3.367 -0.045*** -3.364 
CAREDV 0.937*** 5.197 0.373*** 5.201 
PCARE 0.000 0.486 0.000 0.486 
CALDV -0.373 -1.411 -0.149 -1.411 
 
PCAL 0.000 0.233 0.000 0.233 
MCAREDV 0.256 0.891 0.102 0.893 
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Variable Coefficient T-Ratio Marginal Effect T-Ratio 
PMCARE -0.002 -0.671 -0.001 -0.673 
MCALDV 0.063 0.398 0.025 0.398 
PMCAL 0.000 -0.156 0.000 -0.156 
     
Number of Observations  706 
Log-Likelihood Function   -353.621 
Restricted Log-Likelihood Function  -489.336 
Chi-Square Test Statistic   271.431*** 
Degrees of Freedom   36 
     
*   significant at the 0.10 level   
**  significant at the 0.05 level   
*** significant at the 0.01 level   
     
NOTE: All estimated marginal effects are evaluated at sample mean values. 
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Appendix D 
 
Parameter Estimates (Dependent Variable: HIV) 
 
 
Panel A: Tobit Model Panel B: Sample Selection Model
Variable Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient 
Constant -3438.800** -1249.896** -4312.790 
 (-2.245) (-2.214) (-1.243) 
County Epidemiology Variables 
SAIDS 1.760** 0.640** 2.070* 
 (2.386) (2.361) (1.660) 
SDAIDS -8.745*** -3.179*** -11.834*** 
 (-5.359) (-4.973) (-2.593) 
SHIV -0.086 -0.031 -0.032 
 (-0.479) (-0.479) (-0.112) 
Clinic Demographics 
RURAL 10.763 3.912 31.408 
 (0.089) (0.089) (0.156) 
MD 14.267 5.186 -31.810 
 (0.131) (0.131) (-0.145) 
PA 222.306 80.801 198.224 
 (1.488) (1.479) (0.705) 
NFP 423.484*** 153.923*** 493.311* 
 (3.594) (3.495) (1.853) 
VOLUN -54.701 -19.882 -0.327 
 (-0.318) (-0.318) (-0.001) 
LOWPOVPT 405.379*** 147.342*** 592.901* 
 (3.718) (3.478) (1.735) 
WHITEPT 239.435** 87.027** 297.015* 
 (2.166) (2.117) (1.627) 
BLACKPT -414.442* -150.637* -684.000 
 (-1.694) (-1.665) (-1.425) 
HISPPT -491.618*** -178.688*** -650.566*** 
 (-4.116) (-3.929) (-2.900) 
ELDERPT -1647.590*** -598.849*** -2774.980*** 
 (-3.876) (-3.926) (-3.083) 
FEMALEPT 574.007*** 208.634*** 803.256** 
 (3.310) (2.920) (2.203) 
County Demographics 
WAGE 0.010* 0.004* 0.013 
 (1.758) (1.738) (1.328) 
PWHITE 62.178 22.600 180.209 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.137) 
PBLACK 1378.750 501.132 2265.980 
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Panel A: Tobit Model Panel B: Sample Selection Model
Variable Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient 
 (0.911) (0.909) (0.914) 
PHISP 1111.720*** 404.077*** 1496.510* 
 (2.898) (2.831) (1.774) 
Appendix D (Continued) 
PELDER 2185.930 794.516 2004.970 
 (0.882) (0.882) (0.440) 
PFEMALE 2451.460 891.029 2094.250 
 (1.051) (1.048) (0.420) 
Clinic Financial Variables 
FEDDV -512.963* -186.446* -744.491 
 (-1.736) (-1.726) (-1.372) 
LFEDGT 57.180** 20.783** 80.666 
 (2.351) (2.321) (1.620) 
LOCALDV -477.668* -173.617* -669.273* 
 (-1.994) (-1.927) (-1.648) 
LLOCALGT 30.997 11.267 43.790 
 (1.452) (1.450) (1.251) 
PVTDV -97.883 -35.577 -165.759 
 (-0.489) (-0.489) (-0.518) 
LPVTGT 14.357 5.218 24.408 
 (0.783) (0.781) (0.848) 
DONATEDV 169.036 61.439 386.161 
 (1.237) (1.241) (1.016) 
LDONATE 2.184 0.794 -9.498 
 (0.168) (0.168) (-0.324) 
CAREDV 476.461*** 173.179*** 654.224*** 
 (6.339) (5.461) (2.937) 
PCARE -0.124 -0.045 -0.013 
 (-0.513) (-0.510) (-0.36) 
CALDV -129.802 -47.179 -150.400 
 (-1.073) (-1.069) (-0.698) 
PCAL -0.001 0.000 -0.156 
 (-0.002) (-0.002) (-0.263) 
MCAREDV -14.786 -5.374 -43.869 
 (-0.113) (-0.113) (-0.192) 
PMCARE -0.768 -0.279 -0.736 
 (-0.587) (-0.602) (-0.320) 
MCALDV 58.219 21.161 65.841 
 (0.829) (0.844) (0.574) 
PMCAL -0.191 -0.070 -0.226 
 (-0.885) (-0.946) (-0.791) 
Notes: T Ratios are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** represent 1, 5, and 10 percent significance, 
respectively.  For Panel A - Inverse Mills Ratio: 856.634** (2.240). Observations: 350.  Log-
Likelihood Function: -2588.493. Restricted Log-Likelihood Function: -2680.343.  Chi-Square Statistic: 
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183.700*** (Degrees of Freedom: 36). Pseudo R-Square: 0.336.  Pseudo Adjusted R-Square: 0.258. 
Degrees of Freedom (37, 312) F-Statistic: 4.270***. For Panel B - Disturbance Term: 519.219 *** 
(25.251). Observations:  706. Log-Likelihood Function: -2846.256. Restricted Log-Likelihood Function: 
-2997.821. Chi-Square Statistic: 303.130***. Degrees of Freedom: 36. Estimated marginal effects 
evaluated at sample mean.  
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